| Valence<\/strong> The classic “reward-punishment” hypothesis. If a voter perceives the national economy has improved over the last 12 months, they are more likely to support the incumbent government. <\/td> Positional Economics<\/strong> | Voters\u2019 specific stance on how economic improvement should be achieved. If a voter believes the government should not<\/em> intervene to reduce inequality, she is more likely to support center-right parties. <\/td> Positional Economics<\/strong> | Voter\u2019s specific stance on how economic improvement should be achieved. If a voter believes the government should not<\/em> intervene to reduce inequality, she is more likely to support center-right parties. <\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n Why is Belgium the Hardest Test?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Belgium might be the worst-case scenario to find a coherent economic voter. The country is deeply divided, with two major regions \u2014 Flanders and Wallonia <\/strong>\u2014 and two separate party systems, a long history of tedious coalition government formation, and vastly different historical and economic developmental trajectories. This creates a chronically low “clarity of responsibility”<\/em>: where voters struggle to identify which level of government \u2014 federal or regional \u2014 and whom among the coalition parties is actually accountable for economic outcomes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And yet, the 2019 elections offered a rare opportunity. For the first time in recent history, simultaneous federal and regional elections featured ideologically aligned incumbent parties or coalitions at both levels, i.e., center-right. That meant all three dimensions of multidimensional economic voting could, in principle, be tested at once in complex federal and regional settings. The initial results confirmed expectations derived from the theory: valence, high-risk patrimony, and positional economics each predicted a vote for the incumbent coalition in the federal elections.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Figure 1. Average marginal effects of vote for incumbent coalition by dimensions of economic vote in Belgium.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Flanders vs Wallonia: History Shapes the Economic Vote<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the study’s most original contribution emerges when Flanders and Wallonia are examined separately. While they coexist within the same country, the two regions have followed sharply divergent economic paths over the past century, creating different types of economic voters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Flanders, the historical influence of the Catholic Church supported private education and privatization over a state-regulated economy. A traditionally agrarian economy facilitated private ownership<\/strong>. Over time, this evolved into a business- and service-oriented economy with a more liberal approach to markets and lower taxes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Wallonia\u2019s story is different. The French-speaking southern region is rooted in heavy industry<\/strong> (coal and steel) and a powerful labor movement. This led to a tradition of state protectionism and a strong emphasis on social assistance and government-led employment. Wallonia\u2019s economic development\u2014focused on labor protection rather than private investment\u2014encourages voters to prioritize state-regulated stability over asset protection.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In practice, Flemish voters showed the full impact of multidimensional economic voting. Those with high-risk assets voted to protect their portfolios. Positional economics had an even larger effect than valence, but economic evaluations mattered as well. In Wallonia, by contrast, the vote was primarily driven by valence. Voters rewarded or punished incumbents based on the general economic trend but showed no meaningful tendencies toward patrimonial voting. There were simply fewer high-risk driven voters in the electorate, and those who did hold such high-risk assets did not translate that ownership into a distinctive vote.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Two takeaways:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Even in Belgium, where the complicated structure of federalism makes the clarity of responsibility exceptionally difficult to achieve, the compleat<\/u><\/em> economic voter manages to emerge as a powerful force at the ballot box. Economic accountability is more resilient than the complexity of political systems might suggest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Economic development is crucial for shaping the character of economic voters. The same national economy, the same election day, but different regional histories emphasize different dimensions of the economic voter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n |
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