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The Hidden Face of Racism

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The Lipsitz Thesis

REVEALING THE HIDDEN FACE OF RACISM IS GEORGE LIPSITZ'S GOAL IN "The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: Racialized Social Democracy and the 'White' Problem in American Studies." Anchoring American racism, Lipsitz says, are benefits, rewards, and favors that accrue to European Americans because of their whiteness. Hostile antiblack attitudes, within this philosophic context, are merely the flip side of an elaborate and largely covert system of exclusion that places white over black in the allocation of jobs, opportunities, and wealth. Racism, then, is built on a foundation of privileges that European Americans receive because of their skin color. Whites, in this setting, are stakeholders in a racist social order that pays dividends on their "possessive" investment in whiteness. This reality causes American racism to have a persistent, enduring character.

George Lipsitz has put forward a powerful and provocative theory of race relations in the United States. His model of racism differs from others in the emphasis that it places on white skin privileges—rather than ignorance, Western cultural flaws, or innate bigotry—as the foundation upon which racism is built.¹ Whites are racist, Lipsitz states, because they benefit from it—and therein lie the strength and power of whiteness.

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Although I agree with the basic thrust of the Lipsitz thesis, I believe that his theoretical model is limited in several important ways. The purpose of this essay is to address these weaknesses with the intent of strengthening, rather than disparaging, the model.

Class, Gender, and the Possessive Investment in Whiteness

Lipsitz glosses over the questions of class and gender in his examination of the possessive investment in whiteness. Whiteness is a social and economic ideology that places all groups of whites over blacks.² However, despite the ideal of white unity and equality, there is plentiful evidence of class and gender oppression within the white cultural group. The white class and gender system places upper-class whites over middling, working-class, and poor whites, and it places white men over white women.³ This structure of inequality produces periodic class struggles and battles between the sexes.⁴ So, then, bubbling just below the surface of white unity are deep fractures along class and gender lines.

To further develop his theory, Lipsitz must account for and explain both how class and gender oppression operates within the white cultural group and how conflicts among rival groups of whites are mitigated when whites confront blacks. This is particularly important since conflict among competing white groups usually turns to cooperation when whites feel threatened by black advancement.⁵ This impulse toward cooperation intensifies during periods of economic competition between black and white cultural groups.⁶ Whites benefit from supporting racism, which helps to explain why they unite when made insecure by black economic advancement. However, the really puzzling question is why whites accept the short-term benefits of racism even when such benefits lead to long-term catastrophe.⁷ Understanding how white cultural mechanisms function to keep whites from embracing their own interest when race is involved is critical to understanding the possessive investment in whiteness.

Occupational Exclusion and the Possessive Investment in Whiteness

"I cannot imagine a time when black people will be working and white people will be standing in bread lines," Sybil Griffin, a friend, once said. This profoundly simple statement goes to the heart of American race relations and exposes the bedrock upon which the possessive investment in whiteness rests. The American occupational system is hierarchical, and whites are placed over blacks in the allocation of jobs and opportunities.⁸

The result is that African Americans have been locked in the nation's economic basement since they were brought to this country in chains.

There has never been a time in American history when most blacks were not working in low-paying, dead-end, insecure, and seasonal jobs. Historically and in the present, the black job ceiling has been the floor of white opportunity.⁹ This process of keeping blacks from competing with whites in the labor market is the foundation upon which American racism is built. Consequently, the relationship between black and white people in the labor market determines all other relationships between the two groups.

Lipsitz does not place occupational exclusion at the center of his theory of whiteness, although he does acknowledge its importance as a factor that adds value to whiteness. Instead, he argues that race-based suburbanization has had "the most damaging long term effect" on blacks. When discussing the plight of workers, Lipsitz focuses on how the seniority system, location of federal jobs, and the war on affirmative action affect the competitive position of blacks in the labor market. While this is important, the real story about the possessive investment in whiteness is the black job ceiling. Whites have been so successful in keeping the lid screwed tightly on job opportunities that blacks face caste-like conditions in the labor market. Consequently, while the jobs and opportunities available to blacks have changed over time, their relative position in the nation's economic basement has remained the same.¹⁰ This is the critical point that Lipsitz misses in his analysis.

Here I should stress that occupation is more than a source of income. It is a quality-of-life generator.¹¹ Earnings, derived from one's occupation, are the primary source of income used to purchase a low, middle, or high standard of living. People with a middle or high living standard can provide their children with a quality education, prepare for a lengthy retirement, and secure good housing and neighborhood conditions.¹² Job opportunities, then, not only sort and sift the population by class and socioeconomic group but also decide the living standard. Locking blacks in the economic basement produced a gap between what black people can purchase and what a middle standard of living costs. The result is that most blacks have a low living standard, while most whites have a middle or high living standard.

By etching these occupational and income differences into the residential organization of the metropolis, race-based suburbanization made contrasts in the black and white living standard more vivid and conspicuous. In this sense, building codes, zoning laws, and subdivision regulations

were used to create a residential environment based on class and income.¹³ This process transformed the suburb into a “high rent” district.¹⁴ In the end, blacks could not afford to live in either the suburb or in the fancy central city neighborhoods.¹⁵ Class segregation, then, meant the concentration and isolation of low-income blacks in dilapidated and rundown central city neighborhoods and the concentration and isolation of whites in well-kept middle- and high-income neighborhoods. Whiteness is such a powerful force because it provides whites with good jobs and opportunities and a middle or high standard of living at the expense of blacks. This explains why racism is so persistent and hard to uproot.

The history of black workers since 1865 confirms this connection between whiteness and the occupational restrictions placed on African Americans. In the aftermath of slavery, a vicious system of debt peonage, based on tenant farming and sharecropping, trapped most black workers on the plantations of their former owners. The federal government’s failure to confiscate the land of rebellious white southerners and give it to blacks meant that most African Americans became tied to the bottom of the agricultural occupational structure.¹⁶

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, agriculture was a declining, low-paying, backward industry. After the Civil War, each successive decade witnessed a drop in the number of agricultural workers. In 1860, for example, 53 percent of the American workforce held jobs in agriculture. By 1940, at the dawning of post-industrial society, only 17 percent of the workforce held jobs in agriculture.¹⁷ Among white male workers, 21 percent found employment in agriculture, compared to a staggering 42 percent of black male workers. And in the South, where most blacks lived, 50 percent of black male workers held jobs in agriculture.¹⁸ On the other hand, only 34 percent of southern white male workers held agricultural jobs. Blacks, proportionately speaking, were the last workers to leave the decaying agricultural sector. They remained concentrated in this sector until they were replaced by the mechanical cotton pickers in the 1940s.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—when steel, oil, and railroads gave birth to a blue-collar army of mill and factory workers and when the service industry was creating an even newer army of white-collar clerks, typists, telephone operators, and salespersons—most black workers still toiled on antiquated southern plantations. The remaining black workers were scattered across the manufacturing and service sectors.¹⁹

In a period of unprecedented economic expansion, many black workers were shut out of the urban-industrial revolution. When blacks did manage

to penetrate the service and manufacturing sectors, usually they were concentrated in the lowest-paying, most obsolete, and technologically backward occupational categories. Blacks mostly held jobs that would be eliminated as the manufacturing and service sectors modernized and developed, while whites mostly held jobs in the dynamic growth sectors of the economy. Throughout the industrial age, from 1850 until 1940, black workers not only remained locked in the nation's economic basement, but they were concentrated in jobs slated for elimination as industry modernized.²⁰

The experiences of black workers in Cincinnati show how the evolving urban industrial order affected black workers. In *Race and the City: Work, Community and Protest in Cincinnati, 1820 to 1970*, edited by Henry Louis Taylor, Jr., economist Nancy Bertaux argues that the rise of industrialization led to occupational decline among black Cincinnatians. After the Civil War, industrialization, bureaucratization of business firms, and investment in public services deeply affected the lives of both black and white workers. But, as Bertaux argues, white workers as a group took advantage of the new, "good" jobs created by industrialization. Black workers did not, so they lost ground. For instance, as the number of white male workers in the traditional crafts declined, new opportunities grew for machinists, and so, too, did jobs in clerical work and sales. Consequently, the proportion of white workers employed in common labor dropped dramatically.²¹

In contrast, the occupational status of black men appears to have worsened. Blacks lost their hold in the prestigious barbering business and the number of black teachers dropped precipitously. Black males increasingly became laborers and servants. In the female labor market, black women moved into jobs such as domestic service. Concurrently, white women moved into clerical and sales jobs, teaching posts, and factory jobs in the textile, boot and shoe, and cigar industries.²² In 1920, 86 percent of African Americans worked as unskilled laborers and domestic and personal servants. Simultaneously, 20 percent of native whites and whites with foreign or mixed parentage and 29 percent of white immigrants worked in the same occupational categories.²³ The limited choices created by whiteness kept blacks locked in Cincinnati's economic basement, while new opportunities lifted successive waves of white newcomers up and past them. To varying degrees, the black experience in Cincinnati mirrored the black experience in every urban center in the United States.²⁴

During the industrial age, many blacks left the farm for the city in search of jobs and opportunities. There, they found jobs that were different and

paid more. But in both the rural areas and the city, blacks found themselves locked in the economic basement.²⁵ Thus, during the industrial age, the position of black workers in the labor market and occupational structure did not change. When the period started, whites locked blacks in the economic basement. And when the period ended, blacks had still not gotten out.

The 1940 census year marked the ending of the industrial age and the beginning of the post-industrial age.²⁶ Incrementally, between 1940 and 1995, deindustrialization and economic restructuring would characterize American society. In 1940, when this new epoch started, most black workers held jobs in low-wage, dead-end fields, such as farm work, unskilled labor, and domestic and personal service.²⁷ However, between 1940 and 1970, blacks made steady strides, moving from farm and nonfarm labor to an array of blue-collar industrial jobs and white-collar jobs. As the result of a booming post-war economy, the ascent of black professional athletes, the popularization of black music, and victories on the civil rights front—including affirmative action and government set-aside programs—blacks made considerable economic progress. During these decades, the middle-class grew and poverty among blacks dropped significantly.²⁸

Although black incomes grew, the relationship between black and white workers in the labor market and occupational structure did not change. It remained a simple case of white over black. When the new epoch began, most blacks held jobs in those sectors most sensitive to technological innovation and rationalization. As industry modernized, especially between 1940 and 1970, black workers were the first to have their jobs eliminated. As the transition from industrial to post-industrial society continued, economic restructuring continued to hit black workers disproportionately. As the new economy matured, unemployment jumped, underemployment soared, lack of participation in the labor force grew, poverty increased, and per capita income fell.²⁹

Initially, economic restructuring hit less-educated blacks the hardest. Now, there are signs that the middle class is being badly hurt. Wesley Poriotis, head of the New York-based minority search firm of Wesley, Brown & Bartle, said in a published report that “there’s a deep sourness in corporate America that they had to hire minority professionals [due to affirmative action mandates]. Downsizing has been their first opportunity to strike back.” Between 1990 and 1991, Poriotis says, black employment represented more than half (54 percent) of lost jobs at Sears, 42 percent at Coca-Cola, 43 percent at Dial, and 36 percent at McDonald’s.³⁰

Governmental downsizing and the war on affirmative action will further reduce the economic gains of the 1960s and 1970s. Affirmative action, as William Julius Wilson points out, was a policy mechanism that primarily helped better-educated blacks gain middle class status.³¹ Therefore, if the war for affirmative action is lost, it will be the black middle class and their children who will suffer disproportionately. Reflecting on events of the recent past, Mark Lowery of *Black Enterprise* used the black proverb, “Last Hired, First Fired,” to describe black middle-class decline since 1970.³²

In retrospect, it appears that African Americans built their advancement on a foundation of sand. Since “white over black “ characterizes the job market and occupational structure, black economic prosperity will be tenuous at best. Small wonder, then, that historian William H. Harris, in summarizing the history of black workers between 1865 and 1980, stated, “The harder we run, the farther we fall behind.”³³ Over time, jobs and opportunities available to blacks changed, but the subordinate position of African Americans in the labor market remained the same. In 1865, when slavery ended, blacks found themselves in the nation’s economic basement. Today, 130 years later, blacks are still there.

Race-based Surbanization and the Possessive Investment in Whiteness

Although overstated, Lipsitz’s view that race-based suburbanization intensified the possessive investment in whiteness is on target. His essay, however, only partially explains how race-based suburbanization added value to the possessive investment in whiteness. Lipsitz argues that Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans played a big role in fueling race-based suburbanization. This is true. However, the federal policy of distributing discriminatory loans pales beside the role played by local zoning laws, building codes, and subdivision regulation in producing white-dominated suburbs. Whites used these regulatory mechanisms to construct a residential environment based on housing cost and type.³⁴

Income fractured the residential environment along class and income lines, which dramatically intensified residential segregation by race. By transforming the suburb into a high-rent district, land-use regulation allowed income to build a “Great Wall” between city and suburb. Race-based suburbanization, then, caused blacks and whites to live in very different residential environments. Most whites lived in suburban neighborhoods characterized by new, single-family homes, security, good schools, and amenities. Blacks remained concentrated in central city

neighborhoods characterized by dilapidation, poor schools, used housing, crime, violence, and few amenities.³⁵ Locally based planning schemes anchored by zoning laws, building codes, and subdivision regulations played the lead in creating this scenario, while discriminatory FHA loan practices played a secondary role.³⁶

Without the imposition of residential land-use regulations, many blacks would have moved to the suburbs, even without the availability of FHA loans. Between 1920 and 1940, land-use regulations did not exist in the unincorporated sections of the suburb. In this period, speculators converted huge tracts of land to urban uses and sold them to blacks and working-class whites. These workers, in turn, built their own homes on the cheaply developed lands. The availability of inexpensive land lured many low-income blacks to the suburban hinterland during this period.³⁷ In some places, such as Cincinnati, the rate of black suburbanization was greater than the rate of white suburbanization. White planners called black suburbs “bad spots” and a “menace to the city.” They felt that low-income blacks were creating slums that threatened higher-income neighborhoods, and they wanted the suburbs preserved for higher-paid white workers and the white middle and upper classes. Zoning laws, building codes, and subdivision regulations that had been effectively used in the city were now used to keep lower-income groups from living in the suburbs.³⁸ The big occupational and income gap between blacks and whites allowed for the construction of neighborhoods based on the legal principle of income exclusion. These neighborhoods, in turn, became racially segregated communities without the use of Jim Crow laws.

From 1940 onward, FHA loans, federal highway construction, new home building techniques, and a post-war economic boom accelerated the suburban movement. Also, between 1940 and 1970, a second great migration of blacks from south to north—intertwined with a movement of blacks from farm to city—took place. The growing black urban population led to an acceleration of white suburbanization. As the suburb grew in population, the central city declined. As higher-income whites left, the city became blacker and poorer, while the suburbs became whiter and richer.³⁹

In leaving the central city, whites built a world that was truly separate from blacks. Over time, in this insulated society, a view emerged that the suburb was both separate and independent from the central city. To whites, this meant that the suburb had a set of interests that differed significantly from the interests of the central city. As the notion of white separatism deepened, “city” became a metaphor for black, poor, and liberal, while

“suburb” became a metaphor for white, affluent, and conservative.⁴⁰ In this setting, filmmaker John Singleton says, white America replaced reality with fantasy: “[White] America is in denial,” he says. “They’re in denial about its past, its present, its future. Everything about its history is hypocritical.”⁴¹ Hypocrisy in this context stands for the disguised, concealed characteristics of whiteness. Suburban living reinforces the illusion of isolation and independence from the central city and its problems, which, in turn, breeds denial. For white suburbanites, within this context, the problem of decaying central city neighborhoods seemed abstract, distant, and unrelated to their day-to-day realities.

Conservative Republicans were first to understand the social and political significance of race-based suburbanization. Almost from the beginning, they recognized that the suburban movement created a unique opportunity to overthrow New Deal policies by engineering a renewal of racism, albeit in a new form. Historian Richard C. Wade says that suburban captivity of politics started in 1949 with William F. Buckley’s founding of the conservative magazine, *National Review*. He argues that the movement took a giant step in the Goldwater presidential campaign. Although an electoral disaster, the campaign nevertheless was an ideological triumph that spawned the rise of the party’s right wing. The same ideology soon co-opted formerly liberal journals such as *The Public Interest*, *Commentary*, and, most recently, *The New Republic*.⁴² Meanwhile, an interlocking directorate of conservative think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Manhattan Institute provided a scholarly base and intellectual respectability that previous generations of conservatives had lacked. Bolstered by prosperous business-oriented foundations and the growth of suburban isolation and white frustration and anxiety, right-wing conservatives convinced whites to embrace the whiteness ideal.⁴³

They did this by reinforcing the notion that the white suburb was both separate and independent from the central city. White conservatives further argued that the fiscal problems of suburbia could be solved by using the simplistic formula of less taxes, government, and welfare and more prisons, tougher sentencing, and the death penalty. Concurrently, right-wing conservatives called on whites to declare war on affirmative action. They said that employment goals, set-aside programs, and minority loans and scholarship programs took away jobs and opportunities that should go to white people. In essence, conservatives called for unity among whites across the ideological, class, and gender divide.⁴⁴

When outlining their vision for America, conservatives speak in a language of concealment that hides the racialized character of their ideas and makes their message appear universal. In this way, the conservatives succeed in making both whiteness and suburban chauvinism invisible. The strength of the conservative appeal lies in its ability to reassure suburban whites that their possessive investment in whiteness is secure and to offer simple solutions to the complex problems facing Americans. The election of November 1994 reaffirmed and sanctioned this conservative strategy. An analysis of the election returns show that the strength and power of the Republican victory came from the suburbs and that the national vote split along central city and suburban lines.⁴⁵ Therefore, Professor Wade warns, "the conservative political tide [is not] likely to recede, because it is based on powerful historical and demographic trends."⁴⁶

Presence of Mind and the Possessive Investment in Whiteness

Lipsitz must expand the "presence of mind" idea. As currently formulated, it is too simplistic. To counter the destructive consequences of whiteness, black and white people must work together. But this is easier said than done. In both the past and present, the cultural mechanisms of white supremacy have undermined efforts to build sustainable racial unity. This is especially true during periods of intense job competition. Historically, in these moments, unity across the colorline has foundered. This happened because the ideology of whiteness draws its power from the economic benefits that whites derive from racial exploitation and oppression. In slack labor markets, whites rely on whiteness to give them a competitive edge in job acquisition. Naked self-interest, then, is the force that thwarts efforts to sustain unity between blacks and whites.

It will take more than "presence of mind" to dilute whiteness. Awareness of whiteness and its destructive consequences is a necessary first step, but it is not enough. Conflict characterizes most intragroup relations among whites. Historically, however, when it comes to blacks, appeals to whiteness have spawned cooperation among rival groups, despite differences over class and gender.

Many whites believe that whiteness is responsible for their prosperity. They will not abandon the existing system until that system threatens their own material well-being. So, then, sustained racial unity will not happen until a plan is formulated that promotes the interests of both blacks and whites. This will require stimulating public discourse on the "real"

economic, social, and political issues affecting blacks, whites, and the entire nation, and it will require formulation of bipartisan action agendas designed to attack "real" problems caused by economic restructuring and race-based suburbanization. Put another way, to build unity between blacks and whites, and to overcome the forces of whiteness, it will be necessary to formulate a strategy to expand dramatically the job base and to build neighborhoods where a low standard of living does not mean living in dilapidated housing, located in crime-infested communities where hopelessness abounds.

NOTES

1. Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America* (New York, 1967); and Raymond S. Franklin and Solomon Resnik, *The Political Economy of Racism* (New York, 1973).

2. Charles L. Flynn, Jr., *White Land, Black Labor: Caste and Class in Late Nineteenth-Century Georgia* (Baton Rouge, La., 1983), 1–5.

3. Winifred D. Wandersee, *Women's Work and Family Values, 1920–1940* (Cambridge, Mass., 1981).

4. C. Vann Woodward, *Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel* (1970; New York, 1987); Woodward, *Origins of the New South, 1877–1913* (Baton Rouge, La., 1971); Sidney Fine, *Sit Down: The General Motors Strike of 1936–1937* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1969).

5. The most classic example of white capitulation to racism occurred during the Southern Populist Movement of the late nineteenth century. See Woodward, *Tom Watson*.

6. William Cheek and Aimee Lee Cheek, "John Mercer Langston and the Cincinnati Riot of 1841," in *Race and the City: Work, Community, and Protest in Cincinnati, 1820 to 1970*, ed. Henry Louis Taylor, Jr. (Urbana, Ill., 1993), 29–69.

7. Southern society during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries provides a dramatic example of how a whole region remains backward because of its inability to grapple with the question of race. Flynn, *White Land, Black Labor*, 29–56; "Affirmative Action on the Edge," *U.S. News and World Report*, 13 Feb. 1995, 32–38; Joe Klein, "The End of Affirmative Action," *Newsweek*, 13 Feb. 1995, 36–37.

8. John W. Blassingame, *The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South* (New York, 1979); Claudia Dale Goldin, *Urban Slavery in the American South, 1820–1860: A Quantitative History* (Chicago, 1976); Roger Lane, *William Dorsey's Philadelphia and Ours: On the Past and Future of the Black City in America* (New York, 1991); "Blacks in the Economy," in *A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society*, ed. Gerald David Jaynes and Robin Williams, Jr. (Washington, D.C., 1989), 271–328.

9. Jacqueline Jones, "Southern Diaspora: Origins of the Northern Underclass," 27–54; Joe William Trotter, Jr., "Blacks in the Urban North: The Underclass Question in Historical Perspective," 55–81; and Thomas J. Sugrue, "The Structures of Urban Poverty: The Reorganization of Space and Work in Three Periods of American

History," 85–117, all in *The Underclass Debate: Views from History*, ed. Michael B. Katz (Princeton, 1993). Also, see William Julius Wilson, *The Ghetto Underclass: Social Science Perspectives* (Newbury Park, England, 1993).

10. Henry Louis Taylor, Jr., introduction to *Race and the City*, 1–28.

11. Nancy Green Leigh, *Stemming Middle-Class Decline: The Challenges to Economic Development Planning* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1994).

12. Leigh, *Middle-Class Decline*, 11–31, 32. In 1994, for example, significant differences existed in the median weekly earnings between black and white workers. According to Labor Department figures, the combined median weekly earnings of white males and females were 30 percent higher than the combined median weekly earnings of black males and females (*Focus* [Feb. 1995]: 3).

13. Henry Louis Taylor, Jr., "City Building, Public Policy, the Rise of the Industrial City, and Black Ghetto-Slum Formation in Cincinnati, 1850–1940," in *Race and the City*, 156–92.

14. Henry Louis Taylor, Jr., "Menace to the City: Black Suburbanization and the City Planning Movement in Cincinnati, 1870 to 1950," Fifth National Conference on American Planning History, November 1993, Chicago, Ill.

15. William Julius Wilson argues that the concept of social isolation is key to understanding how the outmigration of higher-income groups from the central city has devastated black central city communities. William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner-City, the Underclass, and Public Policy* (Chicago, 1987), 60–61, 125–39.

16. Flynn, *White Land, Black Labor*.

17. Stanley Lebergott, "Labor Force and Employment, 1800–1960," *Output, Employment, and Productivity in the United States after 1800* (New York, 1966), 118–19; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, *Long-Term Economic Growth, 1860–1970* (Washington, D.C., 1973), 260–63.

18. U.S. Bureau of Census, *Population: The Labor Force, Occupation, Industry, Employment, and Income, Part 1: United States Summary* (Washington, D.C., 1943), 188.

19. Bureau of Census, *Population: The Labor Force*, 88–97, 188–89.

20. For example, in 1940, black male workers comprised less than 0.3 percent of the professional and semiprofessional workers, proprietors, managers and officials, craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers. They comprised only 0.6 percent of the operatives and kindred workers, and 0.8 percent of the farmers and farm managers. Only the other hand, black male workers comprised 60 percent of domestic service workers, 21 percent of farm laborers and farm foremen, and 21 percent of laborers. Bureau of Census, *Population: The Labor Force*, 88. Also, see Margo Anderson Conk, *A History of Occupational Statistics, 1870–1940* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1980); Alba M. Edwards, "The Negro as a Factor in the Nation's Labor Force," *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 31 (1936): 529–40. Lebergott, "Labor Force and Employment," 118–19; Bureau of Economic Analysis, *Economic Growth*, 260–63; Bureau of Census, *Population: The Labor Force*, 88–97.

21. Nancy Bertaux, "Structural Economic Change and Occupational Decline Among Black Workers in Nineteenth-Century Cincinnati," in Taylor, *Race and the City*, 126–55.

22. *Ibid.*, 144–46.

23. Taylor, "City Building and Public Policy," 172–73.

24. Joe William Trotter, Jr., ed., *The Great Migration in Historical Perspective: New Dimensions of Race, Class, and Gender* (Bloomington, Ind., 1991); Joe William

Trotter, Jr., *Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915–1945* (Urbana, Ill., 1986); John Bodner, Roger Simon, and Michael P. Weber, *Lives of Their Own: Blacks, Italians, and Poles in Pittsburg, 1900–1960* (Urbana, Ill., 1982); James R. Grossman, *Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration* (Chicago, 1989).

25. Typically, scholars focus on the differences between jobs and opportunities that blacks had in the city versus the rural areas. In this analysis, the focus is on both the “location” of jobs within the economic structure and on the “types” of jobs held by blacks. Jobs in the city were different and paid more than those in the countryside, but in both places jobs were concentrated in the economic basement. This type of conceptual framework is critical to understanding the plight of black workers over time. See, for example, Trotter, *The Great Migration*; and Edwards, “Negro as a Factor,” 529–40.

26. Henry Louis Taylor, Jr., ed. *African Americans and the Rise of Buffalo's Post-Industrial City, 1940 to Present* (Buffalo, N.Y., 1990).

27. Jaynes and Williams, *Common Destiny*, 273.

28. *Ibid.*, 294–324.

29. Brenda L. Moore, “Employment, Economic Opportunity and Class among Blacks in Buffalo,” in *African Americans*, 48–65; Arthur Butler, Henry Louis Taylor, Jr., and Doo-Ha Ryu, “Work and Black Neighborhood Life in Buffalo, 1930–1980,” in *African Americans*, 112–56; Jaynes and Williams, *Common Destiny*, 294–324; William W. Goldsmith and Edward J. Blakely, *Separate Societies: Poverty and Inequality in U.S. Cities* (Philadelphia, 1992); John D. Kasarda, “Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass,” in *The Ghetto Underclass: Social Science Perspectives* (Newbury Park, Calif., 1993); Wilson, *Truly Disadvantaged*, 43–64.

30. Mark Lowery, “The War on Equal Opportunity,” *Black Enterprise*, (Feb. 1995): 149–54.

31. Wilson, *Truly Disadvantaged*, 112–18.

32. Lowery, “The War,” 150.

33. William H. Harris, *The Harder We Run: Black Workers since the Civil War* (New York, 1982).

34. Taylor, “City Building, Public Policy,” 156–92; Taylor, “Menace to the City”; Patricia Burgess, *Planning for the Private Interest: Land Use Controls and Residential Patterns in Columbus, Ohio, 1900–1970* (Columbus, Ohio, 1994); Marc A. Weiss, *The Rise of the Community Builders: The American Real Estate Industry and Urban Land Planning* (New York, 1987).

35. Douglas S. Massey and Nancy Denton, *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* (Cambridge; Mass., 1993); Phillip Clay, “The (Un)Housed City: Racial Patterns of Segregation, Housing Quality and Affordability,” in *The Metropolis in Black and White: Place, Power, and Polarization* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1992), 93–107; Wilson, *Truly Disadvantaged*, 20–62.

36. Harold Carter, *Social Areas in Cities: Past and Future* (College Park, Md., 1984), 9, 13–14; Kenneth T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York, 1985), 190–218.

37. Henry Louis Taylor, Jr., “The Building of A Black Industrial Suburb: The Lincoln Heights Story,” (Ph.D. diss., State University at Buffalo, 1979); Taylor, “Menace to the City”; Richard Harris, “Self-Building in the Urban Housing Market,” *Economic Geography* 67 (1991): 1–21; Richard Harris, “Self-Building and the Social Geography of Toronto, 1901–1913: A Challenge for Urban Theory,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 15 (1990): 387–404; Andrew Wiese, “Places of

Our Own: Suburban Black Towns before 1960," *Journal of Urban History* 19 (May 1993), 30–54.

38. Taylor, "Menace to the City."

39. William H. Frey, "Black In-Migration, White Flight, and the Changing Economic Base of the Central City," *American Journal of Sociology* 85 (May 1980): 1396–417.

40. Massey and Denton, *American Apartheid*.

41. Gene Seymour, "John Singleton Depicts America with Single-Minded Shrewdness," *Buffalo News*, 22 Jan. 1995.

42. Richard C. Wade, "The Suburbanization of New York," *Nassau and Suffolk Edition*, 1 Jan. 1995.

43. *Ibid.*, A36.

44. *Ibid.*; "Affirmative Action on the Edge," *U.S. News and World Report*, 13 Feb. 1995; Klein, "The End of Affirmative Action," *Newsweek*, 13 Feb. 1995.

45. In Buffalo, New York, for example, Governor Cuomo, the Democratic incumbent won the central city handily but lost the suburban vote by an equally wide margin. Even more insightful, the Democratic candidate for New York State comptroller, Carl McCall, carried the central city by a wide margin but lost to the Republican candidate in a tightly contested battle in the suburbs. He won Erie County on the basis of his strong central city showing. Finally, McCall was one of the few statewide Democratic winners in the November election (*The Buffalo News*, 10 Nov. 1994). Also, columnist Paul Green of the *Chicago Sun-Times*, in a 31 Dec. 1994 story, reported that "there is an indisputable population shift occurring in the geopolitical makeup of Illinois that overwhelmingly favors the Republican party. Ongoing suburban expansion is turning old farmland into new GOPland, while the Democratic political base in Chicago continues to experience vote power decline."

46. Wade, "Suburbanization," A36.